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KUENG'S ECUMENICAL DIALECTIC 
Bernard J. Verkarnp 
For some years now, Hans Kueng has been advocating use of the dialectical method to 
make peace among the world religions. In this paper I try first to locate his Hegelian 
understanding of this method within its long and complex historical development. I then 
inquire about its value as an ecumenical tool by investigating some of its underlying 
assumptions about the subjective/objective, literary/figurative, monistic/pluralistic nature 
of religious truth. Along the way, doubts are raised about the likelihood or desirability 
of its bringing the various religions any closer together than have earlier absolutist and 
syncretistic approaches to ecumenism. 
Rumor around the University of Innsbruck back in the 1960's had it that Karl 
Rahner had been somewhat disappointed over Hans Kueng's decision to do 
his doctoral dissertation on Karl Barth's doctrine of justification rather than on 
Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit, as Rahner supposedly had advised him to 
do. Whatever truth there may have been to such a rumor, Kueng has certainly long 
since vindicated his old mentor. For although he has openly rejected Hegel's 
excessive identification of the divine and human, 1 he has nonetheless enthusiasti-
cally embraced many other of Hegel's insights, including especially his famous 
three-step dialectical method. This was already apparent in Kueng's 1957 treatise 
on Barth's doctrine of justification, as he tried to reconcile traditional Evangelical 
Protestantism with the teaching of the Council of Trent by concluding that while 
differences between the Barthian and Roman Catholic views might warrant a dif-
ferentiation of "schools of thought" within Christian theology, they were not so 
irreducible as to justify a division of the Christian community. 21t also showed up 
in Kueng's subsequent works On Being a Christian, Does God Exist?, Freud and 
the Problem of God, and Eternal Life, wherein he tried to strike up a constructive 
dialogue with modem philosophical trends of skepticism, atheism, and nihilism, 
as well as the positivist proclivities of the behavioral and medical sciences in gen-
eral. 3 But it has been especially in his efforts to bridge the gap between Christianity 
and the other world religions that Kueng has encouraged application of the dia-
lectical method. Initiated already in his earlier work On Being a Christian, this 
ecumenical project has been pursued most recently by Kueng in his 1986 publi-
cation Christianity and the World Religions. If there is, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith 
has claimed, "a historical continuum in which we can observe at all points a pattern 
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of crossovers and overlaps, interdependence and interaction, give-and-take 
between religions that are unquestionably different but by no means disparate," 
it is, Kueng argues, "a continuum in discontinuity" that "cannot be explained if 
we reject outright 'dialectics. "'4 The goal of all ecumenical studies, therefore, 
he states, should be "a dialectical 'transcending' (Aujheben) of conflicts through 
inner mediation, which at once includes affirming, denying, and overcoming 
antagonistic positions."5 It is within this ecumenical context especially that 
Kueng's use of the dialectical method will be discussed in this paper. As appealing 
as such a method might at first seem, it is not altogether unproblematic. 
In the first place, there is a problem of definition. Juergen Habermas and other 
Marxist-oriented dialecticians have often been criticized for their inability to 
explain clearly and exactly what they mean by the dialectical method. 6 A similar 
concern might be raised in Kueng's regard. Time and again he will invite his 
readers to think dialectically, but apati from the stock Hegelian description of 
the process as involving affirmation, negation, and sublation, he will seldom if 
ever try to explain more fully what the method is all about. 7 According to Ernest 
Topitsch, such reluctance to explain one's form of thinking is all patt of an 
"immunization strategy," whereby practitioners of the dialectical method try to 
escape all critical scrutiny of their views and avoid any possibility of refutation. 8 
Criticism ofthis sort by Topitsch is to some extent indicative of an epistemological 
prejudice which makes it impossible for him to appreciate any approach to 
knowledge other than a strictly empirical one, and on that account probably 
ought not to be taken too seriously. Furthermore, it would seem obviously unfair 
to ascribe obscurantist motivation to a thinker like Kueng (or, for that matter, 
Habermas), who has done so much in modem times to encourage an unfettered 
and critical exchange of views among all patties interested in the pursuit of 
truth. 9 Still, however abusive or beyond enlightenment Topitsch and his kind 
might be, their criticism can serve to remind us, as Goethe reminded Hegel 
himself, IO how dangerously close to sophistry dialectics can come, and how, of 
all forms of thought, it is probably the most obscure by nature I I and the most 
complex historically. 12 Before evaluating its ecumenical applicability, therefore, 
it will be necessary, in lieu of Kueng's failure to provide one himself, to come 
up with some introductory explanation of what his dialectical method is all about. 
As was implied by Plato's reference to it as the "power of conversing" or the 
"art of discussing,"'3 the dialectical method is before all else conversational. The 
word 'dialectic' in fact derives etymologically from the Greek term for dialogue. 14 
At the root of all varieties of dialectics, therefore, including Kueng's, is the kind 
of 'give and take' exemplified in the ongoing discussions between Socrates and 
his followers. He wants to make peace between Christianity and other religions 
by getting them to start talking to each other. 15 But not just any kind of talk will 
do. As Bernard Lonergan has pointed out, the ancient Athenians did not really 
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need Socrates to get them talking. 10 Like any other primitive or civilized people 
of old, they were already full of opinions and stories about everything under the 
sun. Prior to their encounter with Socrates, however, much of their talk had 
been idle. They had not really known what they were talking about. The real 
importance of the Socratic enterprise, therefore, Lonergan notes, was to have 
"put an end to idle talk."17 From a "primary, spontaneous level" of everyday 
language, Socrates moved them onto the "secondary, reflexive level, on which 
we not merely employ but also say what we mean by everyday language."18 
Kueng has a similar goal in mind. He wants to move the conversation between 
Christianity and the various religions to a higher level. Not unlike Juergen 
Habermas' attempt to develop a critical self-consciousness within the Marxist 
tradition, 19 Kueng is trying to move Christianity beyond an ideological mind-set, 
onto the level of a "critical-dialogical encounter" with religious views of reality 
other than its own.20 What this means generally is that Christianity will criticize 
the other world religions in the light of its own teaching, while at the same time 
subjecting itself to the challenge of self-criticism in the light of the truth that is 
found elsewhere. 21 To see whether and how that might work dialectically, how-
ever, it will be necessary to take a closer look at the critical dimension of the 
dialectical method itself. 
As is well known, Socrates operated on the assumption that the "unexamined 
life is not worth living."22 His every conversation, therefore, involved an "inces-
sant querying" by which to stir up doubts among those with whom he was 
talking. 23 Like a gadfly pricking a sluggish horse, he would sting his contem-
poraries with questions, trying to shake them out of their dogmatic complacency. 
Upon learning from the oracle at Delphi that he was the most learned man in 
all of Athens, he set out to prove the same by showing that unlike other supposedly 
learned men about town, he at least knew what he did not know, and that they 
did not know as much as they thought they did. 24 Professing ignorance all the 
while, he would try to draw those with whom he was conversing to the opposite 
of what their first impression had pronounced correct. 25 That is what is generally 
meant by Socratic irony and elenchus. It was an art of "finding premises believed 
by the answerer and yet entailing the contrary of his thesis."26Its whole essence 
lay "in making visible to the answerer the link between certain of his actual 
beliefs and the contradictory of his present thesis."27 
This Socratic version of dialectics, J. S. Mill once observed, was "essentially 
a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with 
consummate skill to the purpose of convincing anyone who has merely adopted 
the commonplaces of received opinion that he did not understand the subject."28 
Aristotle called it simply "the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides 
of a subject," and like Plato before him,29 thought of it as being helpful in 
developing skill in making and criticizing definitions. 30 In its broadest Socratic 
KUENG'S ECUMENICAL DIALECTIC 291 
sense, therefore, the term dialectic can be and has been applied to any form of 
thought, such as Abelard's Sicet Non,31 Nicholas ofCusa's De Doctalgnorantia, 32 
Kierkegaard's "existentialism,"33 Barth's early "theology of crisis,"34 Ricoeur's 
"philosophical anthropology,"35 or even David Tracy's "analogical imagina-
tion,"36 in which the esprit de contradiction is used to bring into focus the 
inadequacy of one or another definition. It is operative in a similar way in 
Kueng's ecumenical theology. A good part of his strategy is to convince people 
that, like himself, they do not know anything so long as they think that they 
know everything in knowing only their own traditions. 37 To do this, he will 
confront them with the "contradiction"38 of their religious views from another 
religious perspective. Alongside a traditional triune conception of God's person-
hood, for example, he will juxtapose an example of Islamic monotheism,'9 or 
over against the Christian insistence upon the reality of selfhood, he will introduce 
a discussion of the Buddhist doctrine of anaUa.40 Like Socrates and every other 
dialectician, he is in search of definitions that are adequate. But no sooner does 
he introduce a definition of one or another religious phenomenon like "mysti-
cism," for example, than Kueng will immediately call its adequacy into question 
by contrasting it with a variety of definitions from other religious and non-religious 
perspectives. 41 
At this stage, the dialectic as pursued by Kueng would still be within the 
purely negative realm of what Hegel calls "understanding," or the process of 
abstraction whereby identifiable phenomena are sharply and rigidly distinguished 
and separated from each other. 42 Such understanding, both Hegel and Kueng 
would insist, is important for any study, including the study of religion. 43 It can 
also prove to be rather irritating to those "whose ignorance is exposed" or "whose 
cocksureness is broken down."44 And if it goes no further, it can even degenerate, 
as Augustine warned,45 into an exercise in sophistry:" or a surrender to skepti-
cism. 47 Kueng himself is aware of this danger, but, of course, like Hegel, has 
no intention of stopping with mere "understanding" or "negative reason." A 
mere juxtaposition of conflicting views, or a mere compounding of various 
features from various religions, he says, will not do. 48 Through all the contradic-
tions will have to be sought that which is complementary.49 Their opposition 
will have to be "overcome" by moving on from mere understanding to what 
Hegel calls "Speculative or Positive Reason. "50 But is such a move possible, and 
if so, how? 
Although his aim may always have been to pursue the truth, Socrates hardly 
ever succeeded in reaching any positive results. One may doubt, in fact, whether 
Socrates ever had any thought of getting beyond the negative dimension of his 
dialectic in a speculative way. For in the specifically Socratic dialogues, as 
Kierkegaard pointed out, "questions were asked not in the interest of obtaining 
an answer, but to suck out the apparent content with a question, and leave only 
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an emptiness remaining."" The definitions of love, courage, and so forth, to 
which the Socratic dialectic would lead were "utterly void of content. "52 They 
were pure abstractions-"indeterminate determination[s] of pure being. "53 They 
may have left Socrates conscious of eternal truth, but they told him nothing 
about what it was.54 They were actually "limits" beyond which he could hope 
to get only by way of turning inward to seek a knowledge of self in terms of 
the relationship with the divine toward which his state of ignorance inclined him. 55 
Plato, on the other hand, was more affirmative in his pursuit of the dialectic. 
Questions were raised in order to receive an answer that would deepen and 
broaden the knowledge of the object. 56 His method seemed more conducive to 
positive results. 57 Thus, in the same dialogue (Symposium) wherein love was 
defined from the Socratic standpoint in totally negative terms, Plato tried, in the 
discourse of Diotima, "to permit the negative to be seen. "58 The "unknown" 
object of pure desire in the Socratic definition now was presented as the "beau-
tiful. "59 What is most significant, however, is that by this stage in the Platonic 
ascent to knowledge, we are, according to Kierkegaard, already beyond the 
dialectic, and in the realm of imagination and the mythical. 60 The dialectical 
process has not been consummated,61 but simply stopped,62 and an "entirely new 
beginning" has been made. 63 The dialectician has fallen into a state of contempla-
tion. 64 The "idea" is present, but "in a condition of estrangement," its splendor 
shining in the form of the image. 6s In the final analysis, therefore, it is doubtful 
whether even the Platonic dialectic ever became truly speculative in the sense 
of transcending the negative in a rational way. 66 
For his part, Aristotle distinguished dialectic from "scientific demonstration," 
and doubted that the former could ever lead to a certain reconciliation of con-
flicting opinions, not to mention logically contradictory propositions. 67 Medieval 
thinkers also expressed doubts about the ability of the dialectical method to 
produce positive results, some by insisting that Tradition alone (or the analogia 
fidei) can serve as a final arbiter between the "contradictory" views Abelard and 
others were bringing to light on a variety of theological issues,68 others like 
Bonaventure and Nicholas of eusa, by adhering strictly to a contemplative 
theologica negativa. 69 Later, from a different perspective, Immanuel Kant would 
also question the power of reason ever to move beyond "understanding" toward 
a purely speculative resolution of the contradictions or "antinomies" of human 
thought. 70 But Hegel himself rejected such anti-rationalistic tendencies/' and 
was confident that by paying closer attention to the positive significance of 
negation, a higher synthesis of truth could be found.72 By the "positive signifi-
cance" of negation, Hegel understood the "internality" of the relationship estab-
lished between the conflicting poles of thought. 73 The negation, Hegel claimed, 
is not just something that surfaces alongside a definition of one or another term, 
and then sits there merely in an extrinsic and independent relationship to it. 
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Rather, in any genuinely dialectical act of interpretation,74 it arises from within 
the definition itself. The essence of the thing being defined involves as much 
what it is not, as what it is. Every determination is by its very nature also a 
negation. 75 The very qualities that define Socrates as a Greek, for example, 
exclude him from being an American. 76 Conversely, every negation is also a 
determination. 77 That Socrates is not an American is essential to and constitutive 
of his being a Greek. Like the parts of a living organism, therefore, every phase 
of a dialectical argument (affirmation, negation, etc.) implies another, and the 
whole of which it is a part.78 Furthermore, as a result of their dynamic interplay, 
the various phases of the argument give rise to a still higher synthesis or "unity 
of opposition," in the context of which the opposites, though still held in mutual 
distinction and contrast,79 are now, by way of the perception of their relatedness, 
sublated or elevated above their originally inadequate, finite formulations. 80 This 
"result" is more than the mere quantitative sum of thesis and antithesis imagined 
by Fichte. 81 According to Hegel, it is a higher, "more concrete," conception of 
reality, a "new definition of the Absolute . . . presenting more fully what in its 
predecessors was only partially and inadequately expressed."82 
Examples of how this Hegelian dialectic might work ecumenically abound in 
Kueng's works, perhaps the best being his attempt to resolve conflicting views 
about the personal or impersonal nature of the ultimate reality. Starting with the 
traditional Christian conception of God as being personal, Kueng will affirm the 
truth of the propositions that God is our Father, or our Mother, or, in a more 
general sense, a "person. "83 The truth of such propositions is then called into 
question and relativized, however, by being brought into contact with the typically 
Buddhist (and sometimes Hindu) impersonal conception of the ultimate reality.84 
It is not that the truth of the Buddhist view cancels out the truth of the Christian 
view, as the truth of - A might, in terms of strict logical contradiction, imply 
the falsehood of A. What the truth of the Buddhist view does is to bring into 
focus the "conceptual inadequacy" of the Christian view of God as a person. 85 
It strips the Christian truth of its "absoluteness":86 That God is "personal" may 
be so---"yet, not just SO!"87 This "negation" is, of course, mutual, and just as 
the truth of the Christian view is relativized, so the truth of the Buddhist view, 
regarded as absolute, is discarded. Having been relativized, however, the truth 
of both views is preserved, being taken up into the unity of the whole, and once 
again "absolutized."88 Both affirmation and denial are transcended. Out of the 
dynamic, dialectical encounter of the Christian and Buddhist views arises the 
higher truth that the ultimate reality is "transpersonal" and "transsexual,"89 or, 
in other words, neither personal nor impersonal exclusively, but both, and yet 
more: the truth is "so, and yet not just so, but SO!"9O 
Such then, in rough outline, is Kueng's ecumenical dialectic. It remains to 
inquire about its value by way of investigating some of its underlying assumptions 
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and the extent to which it does or does not bring the various world religions 
closer to the truth. 
In the first place, as in any Hegelian rendition of the dialectic, there is in 
Kueng's approach an assumption that one can actually identify and understand 
views of reality contrary to one's own. But this may not be as easy or unprob-
lematic as it might at first seem. So far as the identification of conflicting religious 
views is concerned, there is certainly a danger of contriving the opposition and, 
in the process, distorting the truth of the religion with which one is trying to 
establish critical dialogue. Heinz Bechert has criticized Kueng for having done 
just that in his response to Buddhism. 91 Even more difficult than identifying 
accurately conflicting religious views, however, is the problem of understanding 
them. For although some objects of knowledge, being themselves objective, can 
be known objecti vel y, 02 the object of religious knowledge, as Kierkegaard argued 
so emphatically,93 would seem to be ultimately subjective, and to that extent 
capable of being understood only in a primarily subjective manner. 94 Religion, 
it should be noted in this connection, does not seem nearly so exclusively or 
even primarily an intellectual affair as Comte and Freud claimed. Many modern 
scholars of religion, like Rudolph Otto or Mircea Ediade, have followed the 
suggestions of Friedrich Schleiermacher and located its essence rather in the 
realm of feeling and experience, albeit never to the total exclusion of the rational 
element. Not only Christianity, therefore, but every religion has at its heart a 
"God-relationship," and defines or shapes itself accordingly. In order to under-
stand this relationship as it is perceived by members of one or another religion, 
therefore, it may very well be necessary, as Kierkegaard noted in regard to 
Christianity,95 to put oneself in the shoes of these same individuals in a genuinely 
existential manner. In other words, without the free commitment, made in the 
context of love (as in Christianity), obedience (as in Judaism), devotion (as in 
Shinto), etc., it may be nigh impossible to understand (much less feel certain 
about) what one or another religion is talking about. Kueng, it should be noted, 
recognizes this point to some extent by readily admitting that Hegel's "dialectic 
of cognition" must be supplemented by a "dialectic of love" if the Christian 
understanding of God's freedom and transcendence is ever to be properly 
appreciated. 96 But must not something similar apply to all the world religions? 
Just as the Christian "dialectic of love" can only be understood and appropriated 
"from within," so too, perhaps, the different dialectics of "obedience," "self-
denial," "surrender," "submission," or "devotion," such as one might find operat-
ing, each with its own logical structure, in the religions of Judaism, Hinduism, 
Taoism, Islam, or Shinto respectively, can only be understood "subjectively." 
But can one, even with as tolerant and open a mind and will as Kueng's, ever 
really get "inside" another religious experience so as to appreciate the uniqueness 
and difference of its point of view? Kueng seems to think one can, and has spent 
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a good deal of time and energy traveling around the world trying to do just that. 
But others, like Harvey Cox, have tried the same, "turning east," for example, 
with no less good will and openness of mind than Kueng, only to have returned 
home considerably humbled by the impossibility of the project. 97 Was this due 
merely to the practical, logistical problems involved, such as the sheer immensity 
of religious phenomena about which Toynbee had warned, or was it not epis-
temologically impossible from the start, doomed by the social-historical con-
tingences which keep human beings from ever committing themselves radically 
in more than anyone way at a time or even successively? For it is not just a 
problem of understanding one or another isolated concept or proposition that is 
different from one's own. Such concepts and propositions can themselves be 
understood only in the context of an appreciation of the whole religious "universe 
of discourse" from which they spring. But how, short of a "leap of faith," can 
one ever adequately penetrate such a world? And if, because such a cross-cultural 
"leap of faith" seems so impossible, there can be no adequate understanding of 
religious viewpoints other than one's own, how could any attempt to reconcile 
them along dialectical lines not eventually break down or go awry? Would not 
any synthesis resulting therefrom be similar to the kind of easy agreement people 
are sometimes so quick to find between dissenting views simply because they 
fail to see the points of difference involved? 
Secondly, even assuming that one could identify and understand the differing 
viewpoints represented by the various world religions, there is room to doubt 
whether one could or would even want to reconcile them in some supposedly 
higher, dialectical synthesis of thought. Is not the plurality of religious viewpoints 
essential to the revelation of eternal truth? Even granting the unity of the latter, 
does not the finiteness of the human perspective warrant or even require a 
multiplicity of religious views? And does not this multiplicity itself enrich reve-
lation, and contribute in an essential way to the very survival of religion in a 
sometimes hostile environment? 
Kueng, of course, is not oblivious to the value of religious pluralism. Like 
Hegel, the synthesis he has in mind is not a "night in which all cows are black," 
or an Aesopian lion's den from which no trace of variety ever emerges. Kueng 
consistently rejects both the "absolutist standpoint of exclusivity or superiority," 
according to which the truth of all other religions would have to be measured 
by their degree of conformity to the supposedly one true Christian view of 
things,98 and the standpoint of "relativism and indifferentism" which would result 
either in an "arbitrary pluralism,"99 or in the kind of "syncretism" advanced by 
Toynbee, Radhakrishnan, and others, according to which the varieties of religious 
doctrine and practice make no difference in the final analysis, and the truth of 
all religions can ultimately be reduced to some common core of religious experi-
ence, like "mysticism" or "faith. "tOO When stating as he does, then, that "the 
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truth cannot be different in the different religions, but only one ,"'0' Kueng is 
not trying to say that the differences between the religions can be overlooked or 
dismissed. Consistent with his taste for the Hegelian dialectic, he appreciates 
the importance of diversity to the development of truth. What he means by the 
"unity of religious truth," therefore, is that in and through their "opposition" the 
truths of all religions are "complementary" and "inclusive,"102 not in the sense 
of providing ground for a "weak ecclecticism,"103 but in the sense that through 
their critical encounter they constitute an ongoing, although not necessarily 
"continuous," evolution of an increasingly more adequate theology. 104 The unity 
he has in mind is similar to that of a jigsaw puzzle, or to the more dynamic, 
organic unity of a living body, whose parts are adapted to each other to fit 
together as a whole, but all the while remain distinct. 
But does even such a sophisticated notion of the unity of religious truth do 
justice to the plurality of religions? Is there not still a danger that in the process 
of having their truths sublated, the various religions as we now know them will 
become mere shadows of some abstract ideal ecumene, less real in the concrete 
than in the mind of the theologian? The whole aim of the Hegelian dialectic is, 
of course, to render opposites more concrete by bringing them "holistically" into 
relation with each other. But does not the attempt to bring them together result 
simply in confusion? William James once complained that the Hegelian dialectic 
was like a pantomime in which "all common things are represented to happen 
in impossible ways, people jump down each other's throats, houses tum inside 
out, old women become young men, everything 'passes into its opposite' with 
inconceivable celerity and skill."105 James marveled incredulously at how simple 
distinctions between say, the one and the many, could so easily be translated 
into "contradictions," and then just as "miraculously" be transcended. 106 And 
why, it may be asked in the same skeptical vein about Kueng's ecumenical 
dialectic, need we assume that all the various religious viewpoints do in fact 
cohere, or complement each other? Would not the existence of, or at least the 
discovery of, such internal relatedness or coherence require something approxi-
mate to what Alfred North Whitehead, from a more specifically metaphysical 
perspective, has referred to as "an all-inclusive act of experience,"107 or what 
Bernard Lonergan has called the "universal viewpoint"?108 But whether finite 
human reason ever enjoys such a view of things is certainly debatable. 109 Hegel 
himself, with his conception of human reason as Absolute Spirit in the process 
of developing itself towards complete self-awareness,"o was able to afford to 
man "a God's-eye view" of reality, or an "absolute" knowledge in the context 
of which the Kantian duality of numina and phenomena could be overcome, the 
whole of reality, in all its diversity and complexity, could be viewed "systemat-
ically" in terms of the internal coherence of all its parts, and a genuine coincidence 
of opposites could occur. III But was this not, as Kierkegaard claimed, the 
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archexample of hubris-for a mere human like Hegel to have presumed, namely, 
to the divine vantage point of eternity?112 Kueng as much as admits that it was 
when he states that "it is impossible simply to adopt [Hegel's] system of mind-
monism and its ontic-noetic constraints which cover up the difference between 
God and Man,"113 or when he accuses Hegel of having fallen into a "disguised 
dualism" to compensate for reason's lack of "cunning" in explaining individual 
human existence (as Kierkegaard noted), the alienation of the worker (as Marx 
complained), or the tragic dimension of history in general. 114 It is on that account 
also that Kueng, as noted earlier, admits the need to supplement Hegel's "dialectic 
of cognition" by a "dialectic of love." Not only does he mean thereby to make 
more room for the "otherness" and "freedom" of the Christian God, but also to 
allow for the possibility of a religious experience in whose sense of mystery, 115 
a view of the "whole" might be found to provide the framework of unity necessary 
for any coincidence of opposites but unavailable through reason alone. 116 Kueng 
insists that this does not mean "going back behind Hegel," as if a God of reason 
could ever again be altogether displaced by a God of faith. 117 He sees his ecumen-
ical dialectic as being true to the best of Hegel's intentions. I I" Its actual 
resemblance to Hegel's dialectic, however, might seem rather superficial in the 
final analysis. ' 
Notwithstanding his extensive use of Hegelian terminology, the "synthesis" 
Kueng eventually arrives at is not nearly as "positive" in content as Hegel's. It 
is not really a "speculative" synthesis. To be sure, Kueng goes beyond the 
Socratic standpoint of irony, and he does not go as far as Kierkegaard in rejecting 
an objective basis for religious knowledge. The last step in his dialectic is not 
just a "leap of faith." But neither is it simply the consummation of an act of 
thinking. In many ways it seems closest to the Platonic dialectic, which, as we 
have seen, leads up to the "idea," but then falls back, via the imagination, into 
a "contemplative stare." More often than not, as he pushes his dialectic on toward 
a reconciliation of conflicting views, Kueng not surprisingly has to tum to a 
mystical line of thought to express the synthesis he has in mind. In his aforemen-
tioned attempt to bring together Christian and Buddhist views of ultimate reality, 
for example, he must appeal to the "negative theology" of Nicholas of Cusa to 
say what he means by a "transpersonal" or "transsexual" Absolute. 119 His lan-
guage, in other words, inevitably becomes intuitive and paradoxical. Even the 
"limit concepts" (like "transpersonal"), which supposedly "burst through" and 
"sublate" more mundane definitions, have a metaphorical, poetic ring to them. 
Like Karl Rahner's Urwoerte, they may reflect "the mystery of the unity in 
multiplicity, of the essential in the phenomenal, the wholeness in the part, and 
the partiality in the whole," but they do not "define" it. 120 The "knowledge" they 
reveal, therefore, is not nearly so much the "positive result" of "speculative 
reflection" as it is simply a "scientia visionis. "121 
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It could be argued, of course, that such an approach is at least preferable to 
one based exclusively upon an uncritical embrace of the Hegelian "dialectic of 
cognition." If we must talk about the "one" truth that supposedly is present in 
the many different religions, it is best, perhaps, that we leave the first and last 
word to the mystics and poets. For as a host of thinkers, from Vi co to Bergson, 
lung, and Tillich have argued, poetry may very well enjoy a priority over the 
literal meaning of human language, not because it is altogether "prelogical," but 
in the sense that "the human spirit will express itself in symbols before it knows, 
if ever it knows, what its symbols literally mean. "122 But even in its more Platonic, 
"contemplative" dress, Kueng's ecumenical dialectic is not without difficulties. 
Not to mention the specific problems accompanying the increased emphasis upon 
religious symbolism,123 or the usual problems of verification that plague any 
ontological approach to theology, there is above all a practical problem of lucidity. 
The "talk" to which Kueng's ecumenical dialectic gives rise is all too often so 
paradoxical that only a select few will ever have a chance of grasping whatever 
its meaning might be. Who but an Erich Przywara or a Nagarjuna, for example, 
could ever comprehend Nicholas of eusa's statement about God as the "maximum 
in the minimum"? Is there not a touch of hubris and, therefore, inevitable 
confusion, even in such contemplative language? Granted, nothing should ever 
stop the various religions from talking to and trying to understand each other. 
But does it really bring them any closer to the eternal truth to be groping for 
some kind of ecumenical esperanto along dialectical lines? Is there not a better 
way of conversing--one that involves as much listening as talking-that will 
allow more time and room for various lines of religious thought to run their 
course without constantly being subjected to alteration on the basis of cross-cul-
tural, negative references? It may be true-to borrow Kueng's own analogy-that 
"if we know only England, we don't know England." But is it not also true that 
if we ever want to get to know and be at peace with the English, at some point 
we have to bracket whatever else we know about ourselves, the French, the 
Germans, or any other people, and give the English a chance to reveal themselves, 
literally, poetically, or however, in terms of the same relatively independent 
"universe of discourse" in which their culture developed in the first place. For 
all its good intentions, Kueng's ecumenical dialectic does not seem to do that. 
It claims to respect differences between the various religions, and disclaims any 
interest in assimilating all the world religions into one. 124 Yet, in its passion for 
synthesis, it seems unable to afford the different religions an uninterrupted expres-
sion of their own unique messages. 
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